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Clearing the Smog Surrounding
Consumer Auto Leasing
JOHN D. AYER*
Consider the parable of Ben and Lee, two hopeful sojourners in the
wonderland of consumer automobile finance. Ben has just bought a new
car. He may have made a bad deal, but at least the law provides some
minimal standards to protect him. Lee has just acquired a new car-
.perhaps from the same dealer. But Lee has almost none of the protec-
tions which the law extends to Ben. Worse yet, he probably doesn't even
know he doesn't have them. Rather, to the contrary, he probably thinks
he is better off than Ben.
The reason why Lee is in a jam is that Lee has just signed a "lease."
The ordinary consumer probably thinks of a "lease" as being different
from a "sale"--and it is. The consumer probably sees a lease as less risky
and less binding than a sale-and it is nothing of the sort. Rather, under
the law as it stands today, the consumer who "leases" a car from a Cali-
fornia dealer frequently bears substantially all the risks that fall on a
"buyer." What advantages does he get in return? So far as I can tell,
none. But he does get one great disadvantage. It is this: the "lessee" is an
orphan of the law. He is expressly excluded from the coverage of Califor-
nia's basic automobile installment sales act. Other statutes, while they do
not clearly exclude him, are sketchy or vulnerable to misinterpretation.
The practical result is that the lessee normally operates outside the pro-
* B.A., 1963, University of Louisville; J.D., 1968, University of Louisville,
School of Law; LL.M., Yale Law School; Professor of Law, University of California at
Davis, School of Law.
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tective scheme that has been erected to protect consumers in the market-
place.
There is no justification for this disparity. It persists because very few
people understand the situation except, presumably, the people who
profit from it. The area is overdue for reform.
It is time for some examples. Ben has just picked out a New Blue
Volcano that he wants to own. The dealer says that it will cost Ben (after
down payment) a total of $4,000, plus perhaps $1,500 in finance
charges. Ben can't pay it all at once, of course. Perhaps he agrees to pay it
off in 48 monthly installments; this would be $114.58 each month
(rounded off).'
Of course, if part way through the term Ben defaults on his promise to
pay, the dealer may be able to retake the car and resell it. If there is any
difference between the amount collected from Ben plus the amount re-
ceived from the new buyer (on the one hand) and the sum due the dealer
on the contract, then the dealer can collect the difference from Ben. This
is the "deficiency judgment" that so often arises to haunt the person who
can't keep up his car payments.
That is one deal. Here is a variation. Maybe Ben can't pay $114.58 a
month. Maybe he can pay only $75 a month. Very well then; the dealer
may write up the contract for the same car so that Ben pays only $75 a
month-for the first 47 months. Of course, the catch is that the 48th
payment will have to be $1,975, which means that Ben will have to refi-
nance or default at that time.2 But the 48th payment is a long way away
and the deal may look sweet enough now to make Ben forget about the
sour ending.
Now, consider Lee. He goes to the same car dealer and looks at the
same New Blue Volcano. But the dealer does not offer to sell. He says, "I
can lease it to you for $75 a month," and Lee accepts. They draw up a
form that includes the following information (the language is tricky, so
Watch carefully). The car has a "value" (not a "price") of $4,000, and
Lee will pay $75 a month. The contract lists "the total amount of peri-
odic payments to be credited to the lessee in the establishment of any
liability at the end of the lease period"-set that at $2,025. Then it lists
1. This would be an effective annual percentage rate of 16.5 percent See CoM-
mEicn CLEAmo HousE, TRuTH-N-LENDiNG, REGULATON Z, ANNuAL PERCENTAGE
RATE TABLES (1969).
2. This would be an effective annual percentage rate of 13.25 percent See COM-
mnRcn CLEARuno HousE, TRUTH-r-LENDiNG, REULATION Z, ANNuAL PERCENTAGE
RATE TABLES FOR IRREGULR TRANSACnONS (1969). Note that the total of payments--
$5,500-is the same here as in the previous example, but that the annual percentage
rate is lower. The explanation is that the consumer has the use of the principal sum for
a longer period of time. To take a simple example: Suppose creditor borrows $100 from
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"the total amount of period payments not to be so credited"--call that
$1,500. Finally, it lists "the maximum for which the lessee could be
liable at the end of the lease period."--that would be $1,975. What's
going on here? In fact, Lee has just entered into exactly the same deal as
Ben. He has agreed to make 47 monthly payments of $75 each. At the
end of the lease term, the dealer takes back the car and tries to sell it, or
has it appraised. If it sells or appraises for anything less than $1,975,
then Lee is liable to the dealer for the difference. Moreover, the contract
provides that if Lee doesn't keep up his payments, the dealer can repos-
sess, resell and charge Lee the deficiency.
In other words, Lee faces a schedule of modest monthly payments,
with a whopper liability at the end. Of course, if the value of the car holds
up, there is no great problem. Someone else may buy the car and liqui-
date the obligation. Or the consumer may choose to refinance and buy it
himself. But if the value of the car goes down, then the consumer must
pay. That is, he bears the "downside risk." This is not normally regarded
as a risk of leasing; it is a risk of ownership. It is because the lessee bears
this downside risk that he ought fairly to be regarded as an owner.3
If all this seems complicated, read it again, and don't feel lonely. It was
probably meant to seem complicated. At any rate it is difficult to see why
any consumer would give up the protections accorded a "sale" transac-
tion for this kind of a "lease." One simply cannot study these contracts at
any length without developing a conviction that the consumer has been
deceived. 4
I should emphasize here that I am talking about only one specific kind
of "lease"-the consumer transaction in which the user bears the down-
debtor and has to repay $110 either at the end of one month or at the end of one year.
If he pays at the end of one month, he is paying $10 for the use of the money for only
one month, or a rate of 120 percent a year, while if he pays at the end of the year, he is
paying $10 for the use of the money for an entire year, or a rate of 10 percent per year.
The balloon payment transaction is analytically similar.
3. Although the term "downside risk lease" may include many forms of consum-
er auto leases, throughout the course of this article it is used interchangeably with the
term "open-end lease." While the latter term is more commonly used in the leasing
industry, I believe that the former term more accurately reflects those situations in which
the lessee bears the risk of depreciation or loss.
4. This and similar ipse dixits throughout this paper are based on my ex-
perience examining auto leases shown to me by students and other friends; and by
discussing the issue with people who work in government consumer-protection agencies.
See also S. LEE, INTRODUCTION TO LEASING 108 (1965):
It should be obvious that where it is intended that the lessee will pay the full cost of
depreciation, monthly rental rates can be reduced only by lengthening out the period of
usage or by lowering the amortization rate. Any leasing company that reduces monthly
payments too drastically is deliberately misleading its lessee if it does not warn him
that an unrealistic depreciation rate can only result in a large balloon deficiency pay-
ment when the car is returned. At that point, when the lessee finds that he must come
up with a lot of money or drive the car longer, trouble is certain to ensue between the
leasing company and customer.
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side risk.5 There are many other kinds of transactions called "leases,"
and for all I know, they present no problems. At any rate, I do not intend
to examine these leases here. There are, for example, many leases in
which the user does not bear the downside risk-an airport rental car
would be an example. And there are downside risk leases in which the
user is a businessman, presumably equipped with resources sufficient to
allow him to take care of himself. Conceivably these transactions involve
abuses. I don't know. About the particular transaction at hand, I do
know, or at least I have some fairly strong opinions, and these are what
this article will set forth.
In the balance of this article, I undertake several tasks. First, I try to
set forth a distinction, appropriate for the purposes of this article, be-
tween "sales" and "leases," and to show how existing statutes deal with
this distinction. I try to show that the existing statutes deal with it inade-
quately, or not at all. Secondly, I compare the substantive provisions of
two California consumer statutes, one dealing with automobiles ac-
quired by purchase, and the other with those acquired by lease. Here I try
to show that the purchaser is protected while the lessee is left vulnerable,
despite the absence of any satisfactory justification for the disparity.
Thirdly, I examine the sale-lease distinction in four other regulatory
schemes. These are: chattel security law under the Uniform Commercial
Code; rate regulation under the Truth-in-Lending Act; limitations on
the price of money; and the law governing warranties and strict liability.
I contend that in all of these areas, courts presently have the power to
treat the downside risk lease as a "sale," although the existing statutes
probably are not as clear as they should be on the point.
I also consider briefly the prospect that "leasing" will be extended to
goods other than autos. Finally, I examine two reform proposals. One,
developed in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and also proposed as
an amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act seems to me to misconceive
the issue. The other is my own. Not surprisingly, I think my proposal is to
be preferred.
THE SALE-LEASE DISTINCTIoN
The purpose of this section is to try to develop some coherent notion of
the proper demarcation between "lease" and "sale." I will also try to
explore this notion in the context of a number of relevant statutes, and to
show where and to what extent these statutes go wrong.
5. By a "consumer" I mean one who, in the words of the Rees-Levering Act,
buys his auto "primarily for personal or family purposes [and not] primarily for busi-
ness or commercial purposes." CAL. CIV. CODE §2981(j). For substantially similar
definitions in other contexts see CAL. Civ. CODE §§1761(a), 1785.2(a), 1791(a),
1802.1; CAL. COMM. CODE §9109.
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The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that no comprehensive de-
marcation is possible. The problem begins with the fact that "sale" and
"lease," are not, after all, categories that are inalterably fixed by objec-
tive reality. They are characterizations that the human mind imposes on
conduct, and conduct always has a way of being more slippery than cate-
gories. To put the point in sharper focus, it may be useful to recall that
each term-"sale" and "lease"-implies some fundamental notion
about "ownership" or "property." And if the last fifty years have taught
us anything, they should have convinced us that "property" is the ulti-
mate weasel word in the law, the ultimate abstraction, serving to block
inquiry rather than advance it. Property is (to repeat) not one "thing"
but a great number of "things."
An illustration will serve to illuminate the point. Suppose Harold is
standing next to a mule; a harness runs from the mule's head to Harold's
hand. Does Harold "own" the mule? The question is meaningless. What,
exactly, do we want to know? If the mule runs away, will the state help
Harold recapture it? If the state imposes a property tax on mules, will
Harold have to pay it? If the mule bites somebody, will Harold have to
respond in damages? If the price of mules goes up, will Harold be able to
sell the mule at a profit? This is only the beginning; we could ask a
hundred similar questions.
The next fundamental point-it ought to be axiomatic by now-is
that we do not have to answer all these questions alike. It may be that
Harold is the "owner" for purposes of getting the mule back, but not for
paying taxes; the "owner" for paying the tax, but not for paying the dam-
ages; the "owner" for paying the damages, but not for enjoying gains.
The answers to these questions do not exist independently in the uni-
verse. They are answers that people give in shaping (or misshaping) the
universe to their (supposed) ends. Something similar can be said for
leases: whether a transaction is a lease or not, is not one question; it is
many.
All this may be necessary by way of background. But we need to get
back to the subject at hand. One person (call him a dealer) is delivering
an auto over to another person (call him a consumer), who gets the right
to use it, and who undertakes to pay something for its use.' When should
this consumer be treated as a "buyer" for purposes of the consumer pro-
6. Throughout this article, I have tried to refer to parties as "dealer" and "con-
sumer" so as to avoid the conceptual issue of whether a particular party is a "seller" or
"lessor," a "buyer" or "lessee." The term "consumer" is reasonably satisfactory; see note
5 supra. The term "dealer" may be misleading, since a good deal of leasing activity
seems to be carried on by banks, leasing companies, and others. I trust the misdirection
causes no material harm to the thesis.
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tection law? My thesis is this: the ordinary person on the street thinks (if
he thinks about it at all) of the notion of ownership in this situation as
involving the risk of decline in value. Unless he is the "owner" (as he
perceives the situation), he doesn't think of himself as assuming the
risk.7 For the purpose of deciding whether to apply consumer protection
statutes, that distinction ought to be the demarcation between "sale" and
"lease."
The classic treatises explicitly recognize such a distinction. Thus
Story, in his Commentaries on Bailments,8 discourses at length on the
liability of the bailee for harm to the property. If the bailee is negligent in
any of a variety of situations he is liable, Story declares. But by contrast,
"bailees in general are not responsible for losses resulting from inevita-
ble accident, or from irresistible force. . ... 9That is, the owner, not
the bailee, is to bear the downside risk. Williston, who was not given to
free flights of fancy, regarded the downside risk demarcation as more
or less fundamental when he published his Treatise on Sales in 1909.10
Some of the ablest contemporary commercial law scholars have made it
clear that they also share this opinion.1 From England, Professor
Goode and his colleagues have treated the downside risk distinction as
fundamental.12 And there is case law on point.' 8 But let's focus on the
7. So far I have said nothing about the "upside risk," the possibility of enjoying
an increase in value. I will say something about it later; see text accompanying notes
22-24, infra. But as I explain there, the melancholy fact is that "upside risk" simply
isn't that important. This is intriguing, because standard treatments of property seem to
focus on the upside risk. See, e.g., 2 J. KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMEUCAN LAw 390
(9th ed. 1858) which states:The sense of property is graciously bestowed on mankind for the purpose of
rousing them from sloth, and stimulating them to action; and so long as the
right of acquisition is exercised in conformity to the social relations, and the
moral obligations which spring from them, it ought to be sacredly protected.
The natural and active sense of property pervades the foundations of social im-
provement. It leads to the cultivation of the earth, the institution of govern-
ment, the establishment of justice, the acquisition of the comforts of life, the
growth of the useful arts, the spirit of commerce, the productions of taste, the
erections of charity, and the display of the benevolent affections.
There are situations where the consumer has the "upside risk" without the "downside
risk;" for example, under anti-deficiency legislation protecting either consumer goods or
personal real estate.
8. J. STORY, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAw OF BAiLMENrS, passim (6th ed.,
1856). Story laces out his argument with citations to the French law, and the Scotch,
and administers the tour de force with a few lines of Latin. He quotes Heineccius: "In
contractibus, . ..in quibus penes unum commodum, penes alterum incommodum est,
ille ordinarie culpam etam levissimam, hic, non nisi latam, proestat. Ubi par utriusque
contrahentis commodum atque incommodum est, culpa etiam levis ab utroque proestan-
da est." id. §25, at 26-27.
9. Id. §25, at p. 27.
10. . WILLISTON, TIM LAW GoVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON Lw AND
UNDER Tm UNIFoRm SALES AcT §334, at 525-26 (1st ed. 1909).
11. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, SEcURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §11.2; R.
JOHNSON, R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, ATroRmNEYs GuIn To TuTm-N-LENDNoo §1.4;
CoNrmrnuwo EDUCATmON OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA COMMECI LAW: I § 1.5, at 8.
12. R. GOODE & J. ZIEEL, HIRE-PURCHASE AND CONDrIONAL SALE 136-46; R.
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sale-lease distinction as it has been developed in consumer protection
law. We shall begin with the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, then turn
to the Uniform Commercial Code, and then to the California acts re-
garding the sale and leasing of automobiles.
A. The Sale Lease Distinction in the UCSA
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act (hereinafter referred to as UCSA
or Act), adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uni-
form State Laws in 1922,14 is the veritable grandfather of modem con-
sumer protection law. The sponsors of the Act recognized that mer-
chants might seek to evade its protections by engaging in "conditional
sales" that looked like leases. So they provided that the term "conditional
sale," for purposes of their act, should include certain "leases," namely:
any contract for the bailments or leasing of goods by which the
bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it is agreed that
the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of be-
coming, the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the
terms of the contract. 15
There are two elements in this definition. The first is the idea that the
"lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent
to the value of the goods. . . ." By "value" the Act seems clearly to
refer to the value the goods are presumed to have at the time of the
making of the transaction. This being so, the necessary corollary is that
any diminution in value falls on the buyer. This is, clearly, the down-
side risk factor discussed above. The second element is the matter of
whether "the lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming,
the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the terms of the
contract." This element is somewhat more perplexing. The commis-
sioners themselves felt the need to defend it-or rather more specific-
ally, to defend the language about "options." They said in their com-
ments: "That the buyer, in some cases, has the option of becoming the
owner and thus a sale is not sure to take place, is of but small im-
GOODE. & L.C.B. GowER, Is ARuTCLE 9 or' =u UNiFoRm CommRclL CODE EXPORT-
ARLE?: ASPECTs OF COMPARATvE COmmmRCuAL LAw, 325-26.
13. A defendant was not liable for the death of a mule caught in a fire while in
defendant's possession because defendant was not negligent, and was only a lessee.
Sawyer v. Wilkinson, 166 N.C. 497, 82 S.E. 840 (1914).
14. 2 UNIoRM LAws ANNOTATE, UNIFORM CNmIIONAL SALES ACT, (Greene
ed., 122) (hereinafter cited as UCSA]. All further citations to the UCSA will be to
this edition. On the relationship between the UCSA and modem retail installment sales
law, see generally Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44
COMRELL L.Q. 38, 42 (1958).
15. USCA §1(2), at 2.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
portance, for, as a practical matter, the buyer will always be willing to
accept ownership when he has paid the value."' 6
So far, so good. What is perplexing here is that the commissioners,
having covered themselves on one flank, appear to have left themselves
exposed on the other. That is, suppose the contract provides that the
buyer will pay a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the goods-
but says nothing about whether he has an option to purchase? Conceiva-
bly, in a strict sense, one might argue that the absence of any explicit
option to purchase leaves the lessee outside the scope of the Act. If this is
so, it opens up the possibility of a remarkable loophole whereby the
seller-lessor may try to exempt himself from the provisions of the Act.
In fact, no such remarkable reading is desirable, or necessary, or even
indicated, by the UCSA. Two points explain this proposition. In the
first place, there is nothing in the Act that says an "option" has to be a
writing, a piece of paper. Concededly, a lawyer tends to think of an
option as a term of art, denoting a particular type of binding agreement,
frequently used in real estate transactions and thus of necessity in writ-
ing. But "option" has a common-sense meaning as well. There is no
reason at all to suppose that the draftsmen were thinking of the "legal"
meaning of "option" when they developed their definition of "condi-
tional sale." On the other hand, it seems entirely plausible to suppose
that the draftsmen were envisioning the practical concept of "option."
This brings me to my second point.
The proposition is this: In practice, it seems that if the lessee bears the
risk of decline in value, he has the option to become the owner whether
the contract says so or not; it is thrust upon him. Consider a lease deal
like the one described at the end of the last section. Suppose the balance
due from the lessee is $1,000. There is no explicit "option to purchase"
in the agreement. The lessor has just reclaimed the leased property. A
"willing buyer" has offered to pay $600 for it. This means that the
lessee faces a potential liability of $400. What is the lessee to do? If he
feels the car is worth no more than $600, he might as well let it go to
the "willing buyer." On the other hand, if he feels that it is worth a
greater sum-say $650-in his own hands, then he is going to offer to
buy it from the lessor for a sum in excess of $600-say $625. At this
point, what is the dealer to do except sell it to the lessee for $625-
whereupon the consumer had exercised an "option to become the
owner" even though the contract failed to provide it to him.
This was exactly the view of the court deciding In re Brothers Coach
16. UCSA, Commissioners' Note at 3. Cf. RESTATFENT OF CONTRACTS §24(1932) which provides in part: "An offer is also a contract, commonly called an
option, if the requisites of a formal or an informal contract exist..
17. 9 UCC REP. SERv. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Corp.,17 a bankruptcy case involving computer equipment. While the
numbers were somewhat larger than those in the auto cases, the sub-
stance of the agreement was strikingly similar. The "lease" not only
failed to mention an option to purchase, but expressly denied that any
such option existed. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy referee and the dis-
trict judge saw that the user was liable to pay the full value of the equip-
ment in any case, and they treated that factor as dispositive. The district
judge said:
In this case the only one interested and the only one affected by
the disposition of the equity in the computer under the terms of
the agreement is the "Lessee." As a practical matter, the "Lessee"
could, if it so desired, obtain title as against the rest of the world.
The bidding of the "Lessee" would be nothing more than a
bookkeeping item.'
Thus the court was satisfied that the "lease" ought to be treated as a
security interest. A number of other recent cases are in accord.' 9 To find
an invisible option to purchase when a lessee pays full value is the correct
view of the situation; any other would permit the creditor to get around
the statute by the simple strategem of leaving the "option to purchase"
off the face of the agreement while permitting it in fact.20
The UCSA thus provides an adequate, but hardly inspiring, approach
to the sale-lease distinction. To its credit, its net effect is to view a "lessee
as a "buyer" when he is required to bear the downside risk. Regret-
tably, things have gone downhill from there. It seems as though each
successive legislative innovation has served only to complicate the issue.
The next important line of development begins with the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which provides a comprehensive scheme of chattel secu-
rity law that replaces (among other things) the UCSA.
B. The Sale-Lease Distinction in the UCC
The sponsors of the UCSA were concerned that a "conditional sale'
18. Id. at 505.
19. See, e.g., In re Walter W. Willis, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1970),
afj'd 440 F. 2d 995 (6th Cir. 1971); In re Polaris Industries, Inc., 14 UCC REP. SEMv.
182 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); cf. In re Industro Transistor Corp., 14 UC REP. SERV. 522(E.D.N.Y. 1973). A federal judge in Seattle, Wash., reportedly has held that a national
bank may engage in open-end leasing without violating the National Banking Act. This
is so, he said, because the open-end lease is merely a variation in the traditional manner
of extending credit and is the functional equivalent of a loan. See M & M Leasing Corp.
v. Seattle-First National Bank, 43 U.S.L.W. 2419 (1975). See the discussion of Thomas
v. Wright at text accompanying note 38 infra, and Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp. at
text accompanying note 121 infra. The court deciding In re Financial Computer Sys-
tems, Inc., 474 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1973), held that to permit evidence of an option to
purchase would violate the Statute of Frauds. But the Statute of Frauds only bars
evidence when one is seeking to enforce an agreement; in this case, we are not trying to
enforce it, we are merely trying to determine its real purpose. See UmNIFom Com-
I¢MRCIAL CODE §2-202 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
20. See UNEropm Comammcr.L CoDE §9-203, Comment 4.
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might escape the provisions of their Act by looking like a lease. The
Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as UCC) addresses
a similar problem in the regulation of transactions involving "security
interests." So we ask: when will a "lease" be regarded as a "security
interest" for purposes of bringing the transaction within the scope of the
UCC? The Code's answer is as follows:
Unless a lease ... is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest" . ... Whether a lease is
intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case;
however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement
that upon compliance with the terms of the lessee shall become or
has the option to become the owner of the property for no addi-
tional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the
lease one intended for security.2 1
There are probably a number of significant changes from the old
UCSA here, but for the moment, one is noteworthy. That is, as Professor
Coogan has recently pointed out, the old downside risk test that was built
into the UCSA seems somehow to have disappeared. 22 Professor Coo-
gan argues that the omission was an oversight, and that the old test can
be read into the new statute anyway. In any event, he leaves no doubt
that he feels it should be there.23
It is true that the UCC definition will include most downside risk leas-
es. Leases in which options to purchase may be exercised without sub-
stantial additional consideration are generally those in which the lessee
has already paid the substantial value of the chattel in the form of lease
payments. When the lessee is obligated to make such payments he is
indeed bearing the downside risk. But, the fact that the UCC definition
includes such lease does not mean that it was directed at their inclu-
sion. In fact, the definition appears to be pointed at the symmetrical
opposite of the downside risk lease.
Consider, for example, a lease which provides that the lessee may pay
an amount equal to the value of the chattel and which further provides
that he may exercise an option to purchase with no additional considera-
tion. So far this looks very much like our downside risk lease. But now
let's add a variation: an additional term that at anytime during the peri-
od of the lease, the lessee may terminate the agreement without liability.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201(37), adopted without change as CAL.
COMM. CODE §1201(37).
22. Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security De-
vices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 908, 936-
41.
23. Id. at 941-42.
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Now the lessee does not bear the downside risk. Moreover, he would not
be within the protections of the UCSA, since he is not obligated to pay
the full value of the chattel. But the lease is still within the UCC defini-
tion of "security interest." Thus, the focus of the UCC definition is not
on the downside risk, but on the "upside risk." The lessee under our lease
can exercise his option to capture the gain from appreciation, and termi-
nate the lease to avoid loss.
Why, we might ask, did the drafters of the UCC choose to adopt such
a definition? Perhaps there was good reason for it. After all, a major
premise of this article is that different problems require different solu-
tions, and it may be that the security interest provisions of the Commer-
cial Code are sufficiently unique to justify this anomalous definition.
Values may go up-indeed there is reason to believe that values have
recently gone up in some cases (of all places) in auto leasing.24 But the
stark, staring fact is that over the whole universe of conditional sales
cases, the downside risk is the general rule. Indeed, the Commercial
Code seems to have focused our attention on the wrong issue. Thus,
we are compelled to concur with the suggestion of Professor Coogan,
that the sale-lease distinction is insufficiently understood. The absence
of an express downside risk test in the UCC has enhanced misunder-
standing.
The Code definition remains on the books and thus retains continu-
ing relevance to the issues under scrutiny here, as will be discussed. But it
is not the only currently relevant definition. Still another statutory defi-
nition developed in the 1960's, and is now embodied in substantially
similar language in the Truth-in-Lending Act,25 the proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit code, 28 and in California's motor vehicle installment
sales act, the Rees-Levering Act.
C. The Sale-Lease Distinction in California's Law Governing Automo-
bile Transactions
California now has two distinct acts governing automobile transac-
tions: the Rees-Levering Act28 (hereinafter referred to as RLA) and the
Moscone Automobile Leasing Act29 (hereinafter referred to as Moscone
Act). The RLA is the older of the two. Originally it provided protec-
tions for individuals who purchased automobiles and, after judicial inter-
24. This is true (if it is true) because a great deal of leasing takes place in high-
priced foreign cars, where second hand values have been very strong.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
26. UNWom CONoSUMER CREDrr CoDn- (Final Draft, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
uCCC].
27. CAL. Crv. CODE §2981 et seq.
28. CAL. CIv. CODE §2981 et seq.
29. CAL. Civ. ConE §2985.7 et seq.
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pretation, for individuals who had leased automobiles under open-end
leasing arrangements. Subsequently, the RLA was amended to exclude
this latter group of individuals from its protective scope, and the Mos-
cone Act was enacted to provide them with somewhat less protection.
Let us look at the sale-lease distinction in the context of these two acts.
We may begin with the RLA incarnation of the downside risk test,
originally designed to bring certain automobile leases within the scope
of the Act. The RLA provided (and, though rendered ineffective by
amendment, still provides) that
Conditional sale contract means... any contract for the bailment
or leasing of a motor vehicle between a buyer and a seller, with or
without accessories, by which the bailee or lessee agrees to pay as
compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess
of the aggregate value of the vehicle and its accessories, if any, at
the time the contract is executed., and by which it is agreed that the
bailee or lessee will become, or for no other or for a nominal con-
sideration has the option of becoming, the owner of the vehicle
upon full compliance with the terms of the contract .... 30
What we have then is "substantial value" and "option to purchase"
(both from the UCSA) and "nominal consideration" (from the UCC).
Note that the "nominal consideration" standard is no longer disjunctive
as it was in the UCC; it is part of a three-legged stool. This suggests all
sorts of questions. Did the draftsmen think the old conditional sales stan-
dard was inadequate? Why? Did they think the Uniform Commercial
Code was inadequate? Why? Did they fail to preceive that they were
making any change? Could it be that there is, in fact, no real change of
substance at all?31
Our own question can be narrower. We can ask: Will this statute ap-
ply to the open-end lease? Careful analysis suggests that the answer is
yes. Our lease certainly meets the "substantial value" test. It meets the
"option" test as well. The only issue is: what about the "nominal consid-
eration" standard? It appears that the answer is yes here, too. The points
need explaining.
I have already remarked that the problem in open-end leases is that
there is a risk of enormous end-of-term payments. But the statute talks
30. CAl.. Qv. CoDE §22981(a) (2); cf. 15 U.S.C. §1602(9); UCCO §1.301(35).
31. There is at least one situation in which the change may be important, al.
though it is not directly relevant for our purposes. That is: what if the buyer has the
obligation to pay a sum substantially equal to the aggregate value, and the option to
purchase for more than a nominal consideration? Reading the present definition strict-
ly, apparently this deal cannot be regarded as a sale. I have never seen a contract in
this form, and one may well wonder why any customer would sign such a contract. But
experience suggests that consumers will sign a lot of strange documents if they are
clothed in enough elaborate jiggery-pokery.
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about "nominal consideration." How can a big payment be "nominal"?
The answer is that it can't-but we are looking at the statute wrong. The
point is that the enormous payment is part of the downside risk. Thus, we
have already disposed of that payment before we ever get to the nominal
consideration clause-and the problem evaporates in our fingers. That
ought to be dispositive of the issue, but there is a catch.
The catch is that the analysis has not prevailed. The Federal Reserve
Board has implicitly rejected the analysis as it would apply to the Truth-
in-Lending Act. 2 Likewise, the sponsers of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code have indicated their view that separate legislation should be
enacted for consumer leases. 3 We shall deal with these positions more
fully below. For now it is more important to note that the California
Legislature has chosen to treat automobile sales differently than their
functional equivalent, the downside risk lease. Let's see how this hap-
pened.
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the business of open-end leasing
began to boom. Presumably this leasing boom was fueled at the outset
by the allure of leases as a financing device for business purchases, where
there are tax and accounting factors that appear to make it attractive to
dealer and business customer alike.34 But as time passed, -the use of open-
end lease began to spill over into the consumer marketplace as well. Not
surprisingly, the expansion into the consumer market quickly provoked
the assertion that the consumer needed protection against the dealer
through the law."
Protection was forthcoming, but in a curious form. The legislature
responded, not by making it clear that a lease ought to be treated like a
sale, but by passing a wholly separate consumer statute, the Moscone
Automobile Leasing Act of 1969, which purports the deal separately
with the leasing question.3 6 It defines a "leasing contract" as: "any con-
32. BOARD OF Gov-aNops OF Tim FEERA. RESERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH-IN-LENDING,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1974, in CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT
GUIDE 14-16 (No. 326, pt. II, Jan. 15, 1975); BOARD OF GOvERNORS OF THm FEDERAL
RESERvE SYSTEM, TRUTH-IN-LENDINo, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR
1973, in CCH INSTALLMENT CRErT GUIDE 14-15 (No. 271, pt. II, Jan. 16, 1974).
Although there may be a real need for disclosures on these leases, most of them are not
"credit sales" under section 103(g) of the Act, FRB Letter, Sept. 12, 1973 [1969-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE f 31,029 (1973). A lease without an
option to purchase is not covered by section 103(g). FRB Letter, Apr. 18, 1974, CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 31,105 (1974). But cf. R. JOHNSON, R. JORDAN & W.
WARREN, ArtoRNEY'S GUIDE TO TRUTH IN LENDING § 1.4.
33. See UCCC §§1.301(14), 3.202, 3.401" See notes 129-150 infra.
34. For some notes on the tax factors, see text accompanying note 75 infra.
35. See generally Comment, Automobile Leasing: A subject for Legislative Con-
sideration, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 138 (1965). The comment is a useful summary of the
situation up to its time, but the author takes the position, for reasons I do not find
convincing, that a lease requires separate stautory treatment.
36. CAL. CiV. CODE §§2985.7-2985.93. For another adverse review of the Mos-
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tract for the bailment or leasing for a term exceeding four months of a
motor vehicle by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee bear the risk
of the motor vehicle's depreciation. ' 37 Clearly the Act is aimed at our
downside risk lease. But why was the Act necessary if the RLA already
provided protection for lessees in such transactions? Or did the RLA in
fact provide such protection?
Consider the story of Mrs. Jean W. Thomas, a grocery clerk, who
acquired an auto from her local Ford dealer under an "Automobile
Leasing Contract. '38 Mrs. Thomas signed her agreement before the
Moscone Act went into effect, but the case was not decided until after-
wards-the importance of this fact will be made clear shortly. It provid-
ed that she would pay a "total lease price" of $3,856.32, comprised of
$300 down payment and 48 monthly installments. The contract pro-
vided that "for pprposes of this lease," the "cash value" would be $2,-
325.80. The difference of $1,530.52 is referred to as the "rental mark-
up." Within a year she fell behind in her payments. The finance com-
pany repossessed and sought to recover $1,850.77.
The finance company computed this balance due in the following
way: first, it charged her the entire rental markup of $1,530.52, even
though she had kept the car for only a fraction of the 48-month period.
Then it added a sum of $955.32, which is said to include both the cost of
refurbishing the car, and the "depreciation," figured by subtracting its
value at repossession from the so called "cash value" of $2,324.80 at the
time of the lease. The sum of $955.32 plus the $1,530.52 added up to a
total of $2,485.84 which meant that Mrs. Thomas would be paying
something in excess of $200 per month for her use of a 1965 Ford. The
company did deduct the $635.07 that she had already paid before it sued
for this deficiency.
Not having the whole contract available, it is difficult to determine
exactly what sort of provisions were in Mrs. Thomas' lease contract that
would not have been permitted in a sale contract under the RLA. But
several disparities are evident. For one, if the "rental markup" had been
treated (as it should have been) as a charge for the use of money, then it
clearly would have exceeded the statutory limit on such charges. 30 More-
cone Act, including some useful lore about the leasing industry itself, see Comment,
Automobile Leasing-Is the Moscone Act Really Protecting the Consumer, 14 SkNTA
CLAR'. LAwYER 612 (1974).
37. CAL. CIrv. CODE §2985.7(b).
38. All the facts are taken from the opinion in Thomas v. Wright, 21 Cal. App.
3rd 921, 98 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971).
39. The finance charge for an RLA transaction is limited to no more than one
percent of the unpaid balance times the number of months in the transaction-in this
case, $2,025.80 x 1% x 48 or $972.38. See CAL. CIv. CoDE §2982(c). That is an
effective anin'al percentage rate of 20.75 percent. See CoMmERcE CLnAmNo Housp,
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over under the RLA, the dealer would not have been permitted to collect
the entire charge; he would have been required to forgive at least a por-
tion of it.40 And there is one more point. As additional security for the
original deal, the seller took a deed of trust in Mrs. Thomas' home-
expressly prohibited in automobile sales contracts.4 1
Mrs. Thomas went to court to keep her home. She argued that the
transaction was in fact a sale and that the trust deed was thus unlawful.
She lost in the trial court, but won on appeal. 2
Mrs. Thomas struck her deal before the Moscone Act was on the
books, but the Court of Appeals did not settle the case until after that
event. Thus the decision provoked a quick response-one of those legis-
lative-judicial pirouettes that have become increasingly common in a
way that throws a bone to the consumers and a chicken to the leasing
industry. First, the legislature expressly prohibited the taking of a deed
of trust in connection with a lease transaction.43 So far, so good: This
was clearly the abuse that offended the court the most. But then it ad-
dressed itself to the "depreciation" clause, expressly validated the use of
the open-end lease, and expressly excluded it from the coverage of the
Rees-Levering Act. The crucial new section of the RLA provides:
A contract for the bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle, with or
without accessories, which establishes the maximum for which a
bailee or lessee could be held liable at the end of the lease or bail-
ment period, or upon an earlier termination, by reference to the
value of the vehicle at such time, is not a contract by which the
bailee or lessee will become or for no other or for a nominal con-
ThuT-N-LENDNG, REGULATION Z, ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE TABLES (1969). The
rental markup here thus exceeds the permissible finance charge by $558.14. Stated in
annual percentage rate terms, the "rental markup" would be 31 percent.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE §2982(d).
41. CAL. Civ. CODE §2984.2.
42. There is one other California lease/sale case which, while it does not alter the
direction of the argument here, cries out to be retold. The case is People v. One 1955
Buick 2-Door Coupe, 187 Cal. App. 2d 684, 10 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1969). The state had
taken the car here, on grounds that it was used to transport marijuana, under a forfei-
tare statute. At the time of the forfeiture, the car had been in the possession of a lessee.
The lessor sought to reclaim it from the state. A statute permitted lienholders -to repos-
sess, but not lessors. Hence the lessor found himself in court arguing that the document
he himself called a "lease" was in fact a conditional sale. He lost. The court's opinion
relied almost exclusively on the document.
What adds spice to the story is that the lessor in the 1955 Buick case evidently was
the same person (in different entrepreneurial dress) as the lessor in Thomas v. Wright.
See Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal at 6, People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door Coupe, 187 Cal.
App. 2d 684, 10 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1969). Not surprisingly, the statute was later amended
to provide that lessors, like lienholders, might reclaim from forfeiture; see CAL. STATS.
1965, c. 411, §1, at 1726, repealed by CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 280, §1, at 1437 as part of
a general repealer of the forfeiture provisions. For another unsuccessful effort to avoid
the consumer protection statutes, see Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Finance Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 337, 89 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1970).
43. CAL. Crv. CODE §2985.81, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 696, §3, at 1264.
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sideration has the option of becoming the owner of the vehicle for
purpose of [the Rees-Levering Act].44
This is curious language, indeed. Recall that there were two parts to
the old UCSA definition; both carried over to the RLA when it was
adopted, to wit: (1) risk of decline in value; and (2) option to acquire
title. The legislature has not materially tampered with either of these old
tests, but it has added a new one. Reading the old and the new together, it
is only stretching things a little to paraphrase the RLA definitions as
follows: "A lease will be treated as a sale where the consumer has the risk
of decline in value; except that a lease will not be treated as a sale where
the consumer has the risk of decline in value." The legislature went on to
add one of those self-serving slices of "legislative history" designed to
"interpret" the statute. It said that the new sections
are declaratory of existing law and are intended to clarify and re-
state existing law in light of uncertainty in the law as evidenced by
Thomas v. Wright . . . which may be construed to affect the
validity of automobile leasing contracts executed in good faith
compliance with statutes enacted subsequent to the transaction
giving rise to that litigation. 45
Well, well. Whether the sections are in fact declaratory of existing law
prior to Thomas seems open to question, but presumably they are exist-
ing law now.4" The California Legislature has expressly rejected the his-
tory and the logic of equating the open-end (downside risk) lease with a
sale. This leaves us in the anomalous position of having one set of statu-
tory regulations for sales and one for the (functionally identical) down-
side risk lease.
Up to now, I have examined situations in which the law seeks to draw
distinctions between "sale" and "lease." I have sought to show that these
distinctions are frequently inadequate, or wrong. But there are other
areas where the distinction may be relevant, yet where authoritative
sources of doctrine are silent on how to draw the distinction. One such
area is the issue of liability for dangerous or defective products. Will the
"lessee" have the same rights with respect to these deficiencies as a "buy-
er"? Another such area is the issue of the applicability of usury limita-
tions. Will the "lessor" be under the same sort of constraints as the "sell-
er"? In each case, I think the answer is yes; or at least that a court should
so hold. But the area is ambiguous, to say the least. The existence of the
44. CAL. Crv. CODE §2981.5, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1973 c. 696, §2, at 1264.
45. CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 696, §4, at 1265.
46. But perhaps not. I have talked to one attorney who says he is prepared to
challenge a lease contract with the contention that the 1973 amendments are invalid
since they are not "declaratory of existing law." Stranger arguments have prevailed.
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Moscone Act serves at once to suggest that there is much popular confu-
sion on the issue, and at the same time to perpetuate that confusion.
Facts like these suggest it is worthwhile to discuss how "lease" transac-
tions ought to be handled in these other areas, as well. This will be done
presently.
For now, let us consider the direct result of the California Legisla-
ture's decision to treat the automobile buyer and the lessee under a
downside risk lease as deserving of different degrees of protection; let
us compare the substantive protections of the RLA to those of the Mos-
cone Act.
THE REEs-LEvERING ACT AND THE MOSCONE ACT
California, like many other states, has long provided special legisla-
tion that is calculated to deal with the abuses supposed to arise in the
course of consumer installment sales transactions. For automobiles, the
basic statute is the Rees-Levering Act already referred to. 7 The RLA
includes substantive provisions that deal with finance charges, third par-
ty defenses, creditor's remedies, and other issues. The Moscone Auto-
mobile Leasing Act48 deals with a situation which, I have contended, is
the functional twin of the Rees-Levering Act sale. But it accords almost
none of the protections. It is not my immediate purpose to argue that the
protections for buyers are desirable or that they are not. My point now is
only that there is no intelligible--or at any rate no creditable-basis for
the distinction. One aspect of the problem-the issue of limitations on
finance charges-is dealt with later in this article. Another, the matter of
repossession and resale, is also dealt with later. For the present, I propose
to undertake two tasks. First, I will itemize a number of areas where the
RLA buyer gets protections that the Moscone Act lessee simply does not
have. Then I will seek to show that the Moscone Act lessee gets no com-
pensating advantages for what he gives up.
A. Third-Party Defenses
Suppose the following facts: Sam's Volcano Agency sells a New Blue
Volcano to Ben on credit, Ben agreeing to pay the price in 48 monthly
installments. Sam assigns his right of payment over to the Third-Party
Bank. The car fails to live up to some fundamental warranty of
47. CAL. Civ. CODE §§2981-2984.4. Transactions involving consumer goods other
than autos are governed by a separate California statute, the Unruh Act, CAL. Civ.
CODE §1801 et seq.
48. CAL. Crv. CODE §§2985.7-2985.93. For another comparison of the Moscone
Act and the RLA see Comment, Automobile Leasing: Is the Moscone Act Really
Protecting the Consumer?, 14 SANTA CLARA LkWYm 612 (1974).
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merchantability, express or implied, and this default is sufficient to give
Ben a right of action against Sam. The aggrieved Ben quits making
payments and Third-Party Bank brings an action against him. Ben
responds: "Because of Sam's breach of warranty, I am not obliged to
pay Sam. You stand in the shoes of Sam. Therefore, I am not obliged
to pay you."
Here is one of the most dramatic differences between a buyer and a
lessee. If Ben is a buyer under the Rees-Levering Act, his answer is
probably sufficient to defeat Third-Party Bank's claim. If Ben is a lessee
under the Moscone Act, it probably is not. Specifically, the RLA pro-
vides:
An assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all equities and de-
fenses of the buyer against the seller existing in favor of the buyer
at the time of the assignment.49
It also provides:
No conditional sale contract shall contain any provision by which:
(a) The buyer agrees not to assert against the seller a claim or de-
fense arising out of the sale or agrees not to assert against an
assignee such claim or defense.50
There is no such language in the Moscone Act. This matter of third-
party freedom from defenses is one of the most persistent issues in the
folklore of consumer rights and remedies. Indeed, in California it has
been the subject of a tug-of-war that goes back over 50 years.5' To re-
store third-party freedom now by the "lease" route would surely require
some justification-which, to my knowledge, has not been presented.
There is a further issue of third-party liability. Suppose the dealer,
49. CAL. CIv. CODE §2983.5.
50. CAL. Crv. CODE §2983.7.
51. American National Bank of San Francisco v. A.G. Sommerville, Inc., 191
Cal. 364, 216 P. 372 (1923); see also Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin
County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950). There
is one section of the Commercial Code which gives the lessee a thread of hope. This is
section 9206, dealing with cutoff clauses in contracts. The clause permits cutoff clauses,
subject to certain limitations. By its terms, it applies to buyers and lessees alike. Official
Comment Number 1 remarks that the section applies to a lease "whether or not the
lease is intended as security." This permission is made "[slubject to any statute which
establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods . . . ." Of course,
currently, no statute provides a different rule for lessees of consumer goods. But the
section has been amended, effective January 1, 1976, to provide that it is "[s]ubject to
any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of con-
sumer goods . . . ." CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 997, §19. This amendment brings the Cali-
fornia text of this section into conformity with the Official Text of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. As to why the clause was left out in the first place see SENATE FAcr
FINDING ComiIrr'E ON JUDICIARY, SwIXm PRoGREss REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, Thin
UiromiR Co mc L CoDE 398, 561, 643, 648 (pt. I, 1959-61). The section might
be regarded as an invitation to a judge to treat cutoff clauses in sale contracts and lease
clauses alike. The code seems clearly to espouse such a policy. But surely such an
attenuated argument is hardly the protection the lessee deserves.
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rather than breaching a warranty, fails to conform to some provision of
the RLA, or of the Moscone Act. Suppose the dealer then assigns his
right to a third party who acquires it without knowledge of the viola-
tion. Is the assignee subject to the sanctions that the consumer might
be able to impose on the dealer? Under the leasing act, the short
answer is "no."' The assignee is exempted from this liability. Under
the sales act, the short answer is "yes." 3 The assignee does have an
opportunity to correct the violations; but if he fails to do so, the buyer
is excused from payment of the unpaid finance charge. That is not as
much of a penalty as is imposed on the seller, but it is more than is
imposed on an assignee under a lease.
B. Confessions of Judgment
Normally, if someone owes me money under a contract and denies
liability, I have to take him to court and get an independent third-party
arbiter to decide which of us is right and whether he has to pay. But let us
suppose I can get my promisor to sign a piece of paper which contains the
following language:
The promisor agrees that if at any time the promisee determines
that the promisor has not kept his promise, then the promisor
agrees that the promisee may enter judgment against the promisor
in any court of law.
This is surely one of the handiest weapons that a promisee might hope
to possess. It allows the promisee at his discretion to get a conclusive
judgment without so much as a courtesy call to the promisor. Any reme-
dy that so completely ousts the judiciary from its function is bound to
meet with a negative reception from the legal system, and this one has. 4
California by statute expressly permits a modified form of confession, 5
but it is subject to a judicial gloss that removes some of its fangs.5 6 The
52. CAL. Civ. CODE §2985.9.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE §2983.1.
54. See generally B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CEDrr CASES, §
27, at 110-13.
55. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§1132-1135.
56. Restrictive readings on the confession of judgment statute may be found in
Barnes v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953), General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 P. 383 (1923). Evidence that confessions
are still in use (or abuse) in California is evidenced by the following statement:
The Bureau has undertaken investigation of confession of judgment practices
by collection agencies in several municipp court districts .. . . Among the
abuses that have been documented by the Bureau are: improper collection
charges; improper escalation of contracts; improper interest charges; contract
provisions prohibited by Rees-Levering and Unruh Act refinancing provisions;
improper attorney fees; absence of supporting documents with filing; improper
conformance to the requirements of CCP 1132-1135; inducing debtor to sign
confession without full knowledge of its contents; and practice of law by collec-
tion agency personnel.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
Federal Courts, in a somewhat ambiguous series of decisions, have at
least limited, although they have not outlawed, the use of confessions
clauses.57 The RLA auto buyer has one additional protection. The RLA
expressly prohibits the use of confessions in auto sales contracts. 8
There is no such provision favoring the lessee.
C. Consumer Remedies
There are differences between the RLA and Moscone Act in the
realm of consumer remedies, as well. The consumer has no remedy un-
der either act for "accidental or bona fide errors in computation." 9
Moreover both acts provide the merchant opportunities to correct his
violations.6 0 For uncorrected, non-trivial errors, the basic remedy under
each act is the same: rescission.6' The consumer gets to turn back the
automobile, and receive back the money he had paid for it.
As indicated above, the buyer may also be excused from paying fi-
nance charges to an assignee in somT cases, while the lessee is never so
excused.62 Finally, willful violation of the RLA is a misdemeanor. 3 This
may not be a very meaningful remedy, given the difficulties of proving
"willfulness" and the historic unwillingness of prosecutors to bring cases
of this sort, but it might conceivably have some deterrent effect. There is
no such provision in the leasing act.
D. Disclosure of Contract Terms
A realm in which the two statutes deserve special scrutiny has to do
with disclosure of contract terms. Many disclosures are, of course, man-
dated by the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act; the applicability of this act
is discussed later in this article. Certain disclosures are also required by
the RLA, and the two acts bear at least a superficial resemblance to one
another. But nevertheless, the idea that the Monscone disclosure provi-
sions give any significant protection appears, on examination, to be an
illusion.
The basic disclosure provisions of each act purport to give the con-
sumer a minimal understanding of the financial obligations of the con-
tract. Thus, the RLA requires a statement of the cash price (plus any
CALwORNrA DE ARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIr, BUREAU OF COLLECTION AND IN-
VESTIGATION SERVicEs, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 20 (Dec. 1972).
57. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
58. CAL. Crv. CODE §2983.7.
59. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§2983, 985.9.
60. See CAL. Crv. CoDE §§2984, 2985.91.
61. CAL. Cxv. CODE §§2983, 2985.9.
62. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
63. CAL. Civ. CODE §2983.6.
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fees and insurance charges), the down payment, the unpaid balance, the
finance charge, and the total of payments. 64 The Moscone Act, by com-
parison, requires disclosure of the value of the motor vehicle, the amount
of periodic payments to be credited to the lessee in the establishment of
any end-of-term liability, the total amount not to be so credited, and the
maximum for which the lessee could be liable at the end of the lease
term. 5
Setting these two provisions alongside one another raises a number of
problems. For example, there is the threshold question of whether any
disclosure at all really enlightens the consumer; or whether, by contrast,
the sheer barrage of information only adds to his confusion. But assum-
ing he can understand these terms, what are we to make of them? "Val-
ue" is defined in the Moscone Act as "the value placed on the vehicle
which value is to be used as an element in the establishment of any liabili-
ty of the lessee or bailee at the end of the lease." 66 Who sets this "value"
that is the linchpin of final judgment? What is to prevent the dealer from
picking a figure out of the upper air? Who decides how to prorate pay-
ments? More directly, why not simply call these "cash price," "amount
financed," and "finance charge"--since that, in practice, is what they
are?
Perhaps even more important than what the Moscone Act contains is
what it lacks. Nowhere in the Moscone Act is there a section that would
require every contract to declare: "NOTICE TO LESSEE: While this
contract is in form a lease, you in fact bear the risks of a buyer, without'
the protection."
Lacking such protections, the consumer simply is not likely to know
what he most needs to know. What is particularly ironic about this is that
in the RLA itself-where, by hypothesis, the buyer ought to have some
inkling of his potential liability-the legislature has deemed it necessary
to include just such a provision, not once, but twice. Thus, the RLA
requires every contract to contain a statement which provides: "If you
default in the performance of your obligations under this agreement, the
vehicle may be repossessed'and you may be subject to suit and liability
for the unpaid indebtedness evidenced by this agreement." 67
Moreover, once the RLA buyer defaults, he gets a second notice,
which provides: "Notice: You are sfibject to suit and liability if the
64. CAL. CIV. toDE §2982(a).
65. CAL. Cv. CoDE §2985.8.
66. CAL. Cv. CoDE §2985.7(c).
67. CAL. CiV. CODE §2982(a)(10).
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amount obtained upon sale of the vehicle is insufficient to pay the con-
tract balance and any other amounts due."6s
So this is our situation: the buyer, who ought to know he is bearing the
downside risk, gets notified twice of that fact. The lessee, who has no
such expectation, gets no notice. One can only conclude that the Mos-
cone Automobile Leasing Act is about as near to pure cosmetics as a
piece of consumer legislation can be. Or rather, it is worse than cosmet-
ics. By pretending to do something while doing nothing, it creates the
illusion that the problem has been dealt with and thus discourages fur-
ther reform.69
E. Other Provisions
There are other cases in which a provision may be present in the RLA
and absent from the Moscone Act, but in which the disparity is not so
obvious. For example, the RLA has limitations on attorney fees70 and on
venue."' No provision is made for these in the Moscone Act, but general
statutes on these topics may do the job. 2 Further, several provisions of
the RLA deal with down-payments and trade-ins;73 and it appears that
the "lessor" does not normally require a down payment.
Finally, the RLA includes a provision that prohibits so-called "refer-
ral sales" agreements.74 This is a contract whereby the buyer's obligation
will be reduced if he refers the customers to the seller. If the consumer
68. CAL. Civ. CODE §2983.2.
69. There are other disclosure provisions in both acts, but they do not seem to
alter the thesis set forth here. One of special interest is the 1974 amendment to the
Moscone Act which requires that a "solicitation to enter into a leasing contract" under
the act, if it mentions a monthly payment, shall also give substantially the other infor-
mation that goes into the contract. It would appear that the statute was directed at ad-
vertising. At this writing, some dealers are taking the position that a "solicitation" is an
"offer" and that an advertisement is not an "offer," so the act does not apply. Aside
from the statute, an informal disclosure obligation is imposed under standards set forth
jointly by the National Automobile Dealers Association and the Council of Better
Business Bureaus, Inc., in their standards for Automobiles and Trucks . . . advertising
and selling. . . rental and leasing. (July, 1974). It provides:
If a rate is advertised and the lessee is, or may be, required to meet any addi-
tional financial obligation or expense either during or at the end of the lease
period, including without limitation, liability for costs in excess of the price
at which a vehicle may be sold, the specific obligations of the lessee shall be
set forth in the advertising.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE §2983.4.
71. CAL. CIrv. CODE §2984.4.
72. CAL. Civ. CODE §1717 (attorney fees); CAL. CODE Cxv. PRoc. §395(b)
(venue).
73. See, e.g., CAL. CI. CODE §2982.7. As indicated earlier, each act also con-
tains a prohibition on the taking of security in other property. See CAL. Civ. CODa
§§2084.2, 2985.81. The Rees-Levering Act also contains a provision calling for a warn-
ing notice about insurance coverage, section 2984.1 and a provision limiting the accel-
eration of payments in the absence of default by purchaser, section 2983.3. Neither of
these are included in the Moscone Act.
74. CAL. CIv. CODE §2982.1.
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buyer needs this protection, it would seem that the lessee should have it
as well. He does not.
F. The Case for Leasing
This analysis surely suggests that the consumer gives up (knowingly
or not) a great deal of statutory protection when he chooses to lease,
rather than to buy. Is this the end of the story? Or can it be that there are
some contervailing advantages that justify this invidious discrimination
against the consumer lessee?
Practically speaking, my answer is "no." But a few persistent counter-
arguments need to be disposed of to bring this point home.
It is commonly asserted that there are tax factors that might induce
parties to characterize their transaction as a "lease" rather than a
"sale." 75 For example, particularly in times past, the person acquiring
the equipment might have found that he could get more favorable tax
treatment by deducting large "rentals" than he could by deducting
smaller sums for depreciation on a "purchase. ' 76 Additionally, there is
the investment tax credit.77 Under the credit provision, the entrepreneur
who purchases new equipment which he will offer for lease may deduct a
substantial portion of that cost from his tax liability. For any of a number
of reasons, the lessee may not have the opportunity; and if the lessor can
"sell" part of his credit to the lessee, he may have engineered a transac-
tion in which no one gets hurt but the public treasury.
Leasing also owes part of its growth to a curiosity of accounting lore.78
With varying degrees of liberality, accountants have long provided that
certain kinds of leases are not "debt" and thus do not need to appear as
liabilities on the balance sheet. The difficulty with all of these is that they
don't fit our case. Practically speaking, any advantages they may have
are going to accrue to business lessees, but not to consumers. The ac-
counting reasons are obviously irrelevant since the consumer household
does not run on a balance sheet. The depreciation deduction is a business
deduction. The investment tax credit concededly presents a somewhat
different problem. It may be that an individual dealer, enjoying an in-
vestment tax credit for an auto held for lease to a consumer, will "sell"
75. See generally Baskes, Tax Planning for Lease Transactions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
482; Meyer, Tax Aspects of Lease Transactions, 23 TAx. EXEC. 616 (1971).
76. This was generally true under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, but has not
been generally true since the coming of accelerated depreciation under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
77. See Baskes, Tax Planning for Lease Transactions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 482, 491-
95.
78. See generally T. FnLs & H. K.UP, AccouNTING FOR Busnss LAwYE1s
505-22 (1971); Wyatt, Accounting for Leases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 497.
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some of that advantage to the consumer in the form of lower rentals. But
this is sheer speculation. And even if true, the consumer, in order to get
this advantage, will have to forego his right to a deduction for interest
paid.79 Thus, it isn't at all clear in the abstract that he would profit from
such a tradeoff.
There is one puzzling fact about lease transactions that might be char-
acterized as an advantage. That is, the dealer customarily lets the con-
sumer into a lease transaction for a smaller front-end fee than he imposes
in a sale. There may be a small "security deposit," but there is no sub-
stantial down payment. It is not clear why this is so. Perhaps it is because
it is so much easier to make money at the end of the deal that he can
afford to forego the higher front-end charge.
But there is another reason to question whether the benefit of the
open-end lease sufficiently offsets the costs of foregoing the legal protec-
tion of the RLA. It is this: While it may be that the slight advantages
would compensate for what the consumer loses in some cases, there is
good reason to doubt that the consumer ever suspects just what he is
giving up to get what he gets. Until he knows, he can't possibly say for
sure that this is a good deal for him.
There" is one final possible benefit to the open-end lease transaction. It
seems that some consumers-probably not the ordinarily hapless
householders who are the usual victims of consumer fraud, but perhaps
the upper-middle-class doctors and executives-get positive satisfac-
tion out of entering into a complicated razzle-dazzle that they don't quite
understand. True, the consumer doesn't know all the details; but he
knows that leasing is in vogue and that there are some tax and account-
ing factors in the picture. He can go to the country club and boast airily
that his financial advisers told him it was a good idea. There is an in-
crease in psychic wealth. Some people may count this an advantage.8°
OTHER DISPARITIES
Up to now, the discussion has focused on the disparities between the
treatment of the buyer under the RLA and the treatment of the lessee
under the Moscone Act. There are several other areas in which the sale-
lease distinction may appear unsatisfying. In no one of these is there the
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §163(a). I suppose it is conceivable there are
instances where the lessee, contending that the lease is a de facto sale, is taking the
interest deduction allowable under INTEMRAL REvENuE CODE section 163 (b), and is thus
getting the best of both worlds.
80. Cf. S. LEE, INTRODUCTION TO LEAsan 100 (2d rev. ed. 1965): "Dealers
should lease if only to hold on to what has always been the dealer's best business, the
type of people who now consider it a status-symbol to lease their cars rather than to
purchase them."
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kind of explicit, invidious exception for lessees that obtains under the
Moscone Act. On the other hand, the question of what sort of law to
apply to lessees in these other areas remains at best obscure. In all cases, I
think a court has the power to, and should, treat the downside risk lessee
just like a buyer.
A. Repossession and Division 9 of the Commercial Code
If the buyer of an automobile fails without excuse to keep up his pay-
ments, then the seller can repossess the car, resell it, subtract the sale
proceeds from the balance due on the contract and sue the consumer for
any deficiency. If the lessee fails to keep up his payments, then the lessor
repossesses, credits the lessee for the present "value" of the car, and sues
the lessee for any deficiency.
So far, the two are in the same position-and this is the chief reason,
as contended above, why the long-term lessee ought to be treated as if he
were a buyer. But unfortunately, it doesn't end there. As with so many
other aspects of the transaction, the relevant statutes would seem to im-
pel a court to give a buyer more favorable treatment than a lessee. In fact,
no such conclusion is justified, but the point needs explanation.
The issue was left for separate discussion here, rather than being dis-
cussed earlier, because it involves a reading not of two statutes, but of
three. Repossession and resale procedure are not governed by the con-
sumer protection statutes alone. The ultimate source of law on these
topics is the Commercial Code.81 With regard to sale transactions, it is
supplemented by the RLA. s2 This fact is explicitly recognized by the
Commercial Code itself. The provisions of the two dovetail, and some-
times overlap.
With regard to lease transactions, the Moscone Act is silent. Exami-
nation of many standard leases currently in use indicates that the drafts-
men think they are bound by no law at all. But this is a misconception.
The Moscone Act of course explicitly exempts the downside risk lease
from the RLA, but it says nothing about the applicability of the Coin-
81. The secured transactions provisions are primarily in Division 9 of the Califor-
nia Commercial Code, supplemented by some definitions in Division 1. The California
Commercial Code is patterned after the Uniform Commercial Code, subject to some
important differences. So far as here relevant, the most important differences would be
in section 9504(3), with reference to the right to take a deficiency judgment.
82. California Commercial Code Section 9203(2) provides that a transaction,
although subject to that division, is also subject to a number of other specified consumer
sales and loan statutes. The list includes the Rees-Levering Act; it does not include the
Moscone Act. This might suggest a legislative intent to exclude the transaction from the
Commercial Code. A much more likely interpretation is that no one ever saw the
problem in the perspective here suggested.
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mercial Code. On the other hand, as argued earlier,8 3 there is every
good reason to assume that the Commercial Code applies to the down-
side risk lease, just as it would to a sale.
The Commercial Code, as supplemented by the RLA, provides that
upon the debtor's default, the creditor has a right to repossess, if he can
do so "without breach of the peace . . . ."I After repossession, the
creditor normally must dispose of the collateral, and such a disposition
must be carried out "in a commercially reasonable manner."85 Normal-
ly, no disposition can take place without notice to the debtor.80 At any
time before disposition, the debtor has a right to redeem the collateral,8 7
If the creditor is not proceeding in accordance with these standards, he
may be enjoined or restrained from further misconduct.88 If disposition
has already taken place, an aggrieved party may recover for "any loss
caused by" the creditor's failure to comply.89
Moreover, beyond the language of the Commercial Code itself, the
courts characteristically impose a very heavy burden upon the creditor to
prove90 and also to plead9 that he conformed to these standards. Fur-
ther, a substantial body of authority reads the Code to mean that a credi-
tor who does not conform loses his right to a deficiency judgment.0
Finally, and perhaps most important, with reference to most of these
provisions, the Code declares that the parties may not waive the proce-
dures set forth in the statute.9 3
83. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
84. The term has an elaborate pre-code history. See Jordan v. Talbott, 55 Cal. 2d
597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961); Devincenzi v. Faulkner, 174 Cal. App. 2d
250, 344 P.2d 322 (1959); People v. Northum, 41 Cal. App. 2d 284, 106 P.2d 433
(1940); People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. Supp. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (1931).
85. See CAL. Comm. CODE §9504(3). On what constitutes a "commercially rea-
sonable manner," see CoNTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL
LAw 11 §6.29 (1966) (Supp. 1973).
86. CAL. COMM. CODE §9504(3); CAL. Cry. CODE §2983.2. The secured party
need not give the debtor a notice if the collateral is perishable, threatens to decline in
value, or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market. The only exemption that
would seem to apply to leased cars is the idea of collateral "of a type customarily sold
on a recognized market ... ." CAL. COMM. CODE §9504(3). But what if a particular
auto, though "customarily" sold on a recognized market, is in a particular case not so
sold? Will the creditor be able to escape the notice requirement in such a case? Amend-
ments effective January 1, 1976, provide that the Commercial Code notice may be
waived by the debtor in a statement signed after default. See CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 997, §
44 (effective Jan. 1, 1976).
87. See CAL. Comm. CODE §9506; CAL. CIV. CODE §2983.2.
88. See CAL. COMM. CODE §9507(1).
89. See CAL. Comm. CODE §9507(1).
90. See, e.g., Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal. App. 3d 336, 115 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974),
Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1975).
91. See, e.g., Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal. App. 3d 336, 115 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974);
J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1975).
92. See cases cited at notes 90-91 supra; see also Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27
Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972).
93. See CAL. COMM. CODE §9501. Amendments effective January 1, 1976, permit
waiver of the provision of notice of prospective resale in California Commercial Code
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In practice, these all turn out to be slender protections at best; there is
a good deal of sentiment that the consumer-buyer doesn't get enough
protection from the scheme. 4 But at least, he gets some protection.
What does the lessee get? In fact, leasing contracts vary; some give the
consumer-lessee protection similar to the (minimal) protection enjoyed
by the consumer buyer. Some give much less. Perhaps the worst is the
form which says that on termination of the lease, the value of the car will
be determined by an appraiser chosen by the lessor. This permits sheer
self-dealing. At least in theory, there is nothing to prevent the appraiser
from setting the value of the car at zero and charging the consumer for all
the balance due-after which the appraiser and the lessor together sell
the car for a sum in excess of zero, and carve up the swag between
them. True once again, a court might take a dim view of this transaction
if it came to a court's attention-but it isn't inevitable that a court would
take such a view, and it isn't likely that the matter would ever come to its
attention.
Lessors don't need to be quite as blatant as that. For example, a con-
tract in use in California now provides that on return of the vehicle to the
dealer, the dealer shall, as soon as practicable cause same to be sold and
shall promptly thereafter render an accounting of such sale to lessee.
There is no provision at all for notice to the lessee of the prospective sale
and no suggestion of any mechanism whereby the lessee can observe the
sale to see if it is bona fide. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the lessee in
such a case could ever assure himself that the sale actually took place,
other than in the lessor's imagination.
Another contract now in use seems to do a bit more for the lessee, but
in fact does not. It provides that on termination the lessor shall endeav-
or to obtain two offers to buy the vehicle for cash at wholesale, and shall
also receive any offer to buy the vehicle for cash made by any person
specified by the Lessee within three days after the vehicle is returned.
A promise to "endeavor" may not be completely illusory, but it is pretty
close. Moreover, the contract specifies that the lessor may accept the
section 9504(3); but the waiver may be taken only in a writing signed after default. See
CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 997, §44 (effective Jan. 1, 1976). A correlative new California
Commercial Code section 9508 provides that no renunciation or modification by the
debtor of this waiver right shall be valid or enforceable unless the secured party in
exchange relinquishes his right to a deficiency judgment. "Consumer goods" are defined
in California Commercial Code Section 9109(1) to include goods "Used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." That definition presumably
is broad enough to cover a leased auto. But whatever this statute may do to the Com-
mercial Code notice requirement, it does not seem to authorize waiver of the similar
requirement in the RLA.
94. See generally Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A
fourney to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 Om. L. Rnv. 302 (1972).
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highest cash bid received or reject all bids. What happens when he
chooses to reject all bids isn't even suggested in the contract.
What all these contracts have in common is that they seem to have
been drafted on the supposition that the lessor is under no authoritative
constraints at all. There are several ways in which a consumer lessee
might attack them. Thus, a court, faced with such a one-sided agree-
ment, might impose some constraints on creditor behavior as a matter of
common-law adjudication. But surely the most straightforward way of
approaching the problem is the one suggested here: simply recognize
that the downside risk lease is a secured transaction for purposes of the
Commercial Code, and bring it under the Code's protection directly.Y
B. Rate Disclosure and Regulation
If it is true (as I have argued) that the open-end consumer auto lease
ought to be regarded as a sale, then the lease payments ought to be re-
garded as indistinguishable from the purchase payments. Since the con-
sumer in all our examples is paying for the car in installments, then by
analogy, some portion of lease payment must be regarded as a finance
charge. If the charge is properly regarded as a finance charge, then the
consumer has two more protections which as a "true" lessee, he is not
thought to enjoy. First, he has a right to know the finance charge being
imposed on him (the "disclosure" obligation). Second, there is a limit to
the size of the finance charge that can be imposed (the "regulation"
95. Case law on the points at issue here is scanty at best, but generally contrary
to the position set forth in the text. In Executive Car Leasing Co. of New Orleans, Inc.
v. Alodex Corp., 279 So. 2d 169 (La. 1973), the Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved a
conflict among the lower courts by holding that the lessor did have a right to a deficien-
cy judgment. The decision effectively overrules Clay-Dutton, Inc. v. Coleman, 219 So.
2d 307 (La. App. 1969), which appears to be the only decision denying the deficiency
judgment. Louisiana is, of course, the only state in the nation that has not adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code. Both Executive Car Leasing and Clay-Dutton were based
on conflicting constructions of a local deficiency judgment statute. See also Clay-Dut-
ton, Inc. v. Plantation Nursing Home, Inc., 239 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 1970); Mossy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Piggy-Bak Cartage Corp., 177 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1965). And see
Stone Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Anacostia Leasing Corp., 256 A.2d 923 (D.C. App.
1969). In Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Stations v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d
754, 260 P.2d 93 (1953), a California court imposed on the lessee a contractual obliga-
tion to purchase a leased vehicle at the end of the lease term. But the issue was one of
construction of the agreement. The opinion does not suggest that the fundamental
propriety of such an obligation was in question. Accord, American Fruit Purveyors, Inc.
v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 840, 165 S.E.2d 879 (1968); Universal
Leaseway System, Inc. v. Herrud & Co., 366 Mich. 473, 115 N.W.2d 294 (1962). All
the cases cited in this note are discussed in an annotation at 43 A.L.R. 3d 1238. In
Rosenthal v. Executive Car Leasing Co., 435 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), the
contract provided that the lessor would offer to sell the vehicle to the lessee, but if the
lessee failed to accept the offer within 10 days, the lessee would be liable for a deficien-
cy judgment. Failure to give such notice was held to bar a deficiency judgment. Contra,
Brown v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also
Stone Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Anacostia Leasing Corp., 256 A.2d 923 (D.C. App.
1969).
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principle). The obligation to disclose the size of the finance charge is
extended to the consumer by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act, commonly called the Truth-in-Lending Act.96 The size of the fi-
nance charge in automobile sales is regulated by the RLA, which sets a
limit of 21.5 percent per year.97
With that as background, the proposition, again, is that a downside
risk lessee ought to be treated exactly like a buyer. As a matter of elemen-
tary economics, this would seem to be inevitable. But there are two diffi-
culties with it. First, as indicate above, the downside risk lease is express-
ly exempted from the RLA.98 Second, the staff of the Federal Reserve
Board (which is charged with the responsibility of administering the
Truth-in-Lending Act) has consistently taken the position that leases of
this sort are not within the scope of the Act.
The disclosure problem is ultimately a problem of federal law; the
rules governing disclosure of finance charges are in the Federal Truth-
in-Lending Act.99 The Moscone Act may complicate the problem in
California by giving extra impetus to leasing as a means of doing busi-
ness, but the federal act would be there even if the Moscone Act were not.
To its credit, the Federal Reserve Board in dealing with truth-in-lend-
ing, has recognized that the downside risk lease does present a problem
that needs to be dealt with. In its two most recent annual reports to Con-
gress and in its opinion letters, the Board has called attention to the prob-
lem of open-end leasing and called for reform. 00 Nevertheless, it would
seem that the Federal Reserve Board already has the power to deal with
open-end leasing because the definition of "sale" under the Truth-in-
Lending Act would seem to be broad enough to include consumer leases
within its scope.1' 1 Unfortunately, the Board does not take this position.
The Board has indicated that the Act does not apply if the purchase
option is not explicit in the contract, 1 2 and that it is impossible to
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
97. CAL. Crv. CODE §2982(c).
98. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
99. 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.
100. BoARD OF GOVRNnoRs OF THE FEmEAL RESERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH-n-LEMINC,
ANNUAL REPORT To CONGRESS FOR TH YEAR 1974, in CCH INSTALLmENT CREDrr
GUIDE 14-16 (No. 326, pt. II, Jan. 15, 1975); BoAR~D OF GovERoRos OF THE FEDERAL
RESERvE SYSTEM, TRUTi-IN-LENDING, ANNUAL REPORT TO CoNGRESs FOR THE YEAR
1973, in OCH INSrALLMENT CREDnrr GumE 14-15 (no. 271, pt. II, Jan. 16, 1974).
101. See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra (where the RLA definition, similar
to that of Truth-in-Lending, is discussed).
102. See authorities cited at note 100 supra. See also FRB Letter, Apr. 18, 1974, 4
CCH CoNsumER Cumrr GUIDE 31,105 (1974). It has been stated that "A Staff letter
may be the visceral reaction of a harassed Staff member who has before him an inquiry
containing only the sketchiest description of the transaction, or it may be the result of a
lengthy study by several Staff members." Warren & Larmore, Truth-in-Lending: Prob-
lems of Coverage, 24 STrx. L. REv. 793, 794 n.7. But compare the following:
No provision of this section [civil liability] or section 112 [15 U.S.C. §1611,
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identify a finance charge component in lease cases."°8 In fact, there
is no problem determining the "finance charge" for the typical open-
end lease. To the contrary, all the information necessary to com-
pute it already appears on the face of the contract. The dealer is re-
quired to put it there, under terms of the Moscone Act itself.' 0 4 Recall
that a contract of the sort under discussion here must contain a figure
defining the consumer's ultimate liability. 05 And it must contain a
breakdown of each monthly payment, showing the amount that will
be credited against the lessee's liability, and the amount not to be so
credited.' 0  If it is thus possible to allocate the payments for purposes
of the deal,107 there would seem to be no difficulty in making the same
allocations for purposes of regulation and disclosure as well.
This would seem to be dispositive of the matter. But if more is neces-
sary, it may be helpful to note that the California Supreme Court and
other courts have found that it is possible to identify a "finance charge"
component from a review of the whole transaction, even when it is hid-
den from the consumer.10 8 Normally, -the dealer is selling the consumer's
obligation to some third party for collection. Normally, he has to sell for
less than the face value of the contract: that is, the third party pays a
smaller present sum now for the right to collect the larger sum over time.
The disparity between nominal sale price and "discount" price is eco-
nomically indistinguishable from a finance charge. There is another
point. It is not always easy to identify a finance charge in a sale transac-
tion. The seller, arguably, may be able to bury some part of his finance
criminal liability] imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted
in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof
by the Board, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred,
such rule, regulation, or interpretation is amended, rescinded, or determined
by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §406, 88 Stat. 1518, adding 15 U.S.C. §
1640(f).
103. S.R. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967) which states:
The definition of credit sale is also limited only to those leases which are in
essence, disguised sale arrangements. The definition has been so limited be-
cause there is no way to disclose a finance charge or rate in connection with
a conventional lease ....
As the subsequent argument is intended to show, the author must not have been visual-
izing the kind of lease we are addressing here.
104. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2985.8.
105. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§2985.7(c), 2985.8(d)-(e).
106. CAL. CIV. CODE §2985.8(b), (c).
107. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE §2981(e)-(h), California Civil Code Section 2982(c)
limits the finance charge under the RLA. There are some residual inconsistencies be-
tween the approach of the two acts to insurance and costs, and also to allocation of
individual payments between amount financed and finance charge, but nothing that any
reasonably competent draftsman couldn't fix in moments.
108. Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541,
528 P.2d 357 (1974). Accord, Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc. of Milwaukee, Wis.,
363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
955 (N.D. IMI. 1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo.
1971).
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charge in the cash price. But this has never been regarded as a sufficient
reason not to regulate finance charges in sales transactions." 9 All that
has been said about disclosure is relevant to the issue of rate regulation as
well. If, as shown above, a finance charge can be identified in a lease
transaction, there is no reason that a lessee should be given any less pro-
tection than a purchaser. The lease ought to be regarded as coming un-
der the relevant regulation law. 1 0
There is one other "finance charge" issue that may lend itself to judi-
cial handling, but certainly needs statutory correction otherwise. This
has to do with the rebate on early termination. Remember Thomas v.
Wright,"' where Mrs. Thomas obligated herself to pay $1,530.52 as
"rental markup" in 48 monthly installments. (This "rental markup" is
the functional twin of a finance charge.) Mrs. Thomas quit paying be-
fore the first year of the contract had expired, and the merchant tried to
collect from her the entire 48-month rental markup. As the court cor-
rectly observed, if the transaction had been treated as a sale, the dealer
would not have been able to collect a finance charge that it had not
"earned," and thus it would have had to rebate part of the sum to Mrs.
Thomas.
There was no such obligation under the leasing act. Clearly, that was
one of the reasons why the court in Thomas was so eager to see through
the transaction and call it a sale. Unfortunately, that aspect of the statute
has never been changed. Meanwhile, the Moscone Act has been
changed to assure that it protects precisely the sort of lease at issue in
Thomas v. Wright. Thus, it may be easier to impose the "unearned fi-
nance charge" on the lessee today than it was before Thomas v. Wright.
A final, smaller, but still palpable issue with regard to finance charges
involves delinquency payments. The RLA provides that the contract
may provide for a delinquency charge of no more than five percent of the
installment, in the case of payments overdue at least 10 days. It provides
that such a charge may be collected only once per installment."' There
is no regulation of delinquency charges in the Moscone Act.
C. Consumer Warranties
A consumer who enters into a transaction to acquire a product is con-
cerned with issues other than the risks of loss on default. Basically, he
109. Never formally, anyway. But it may have something to do with the develop-
ment of the "time-price doctrine."
110. A recent Alaska case holding a "lease" to be a purchase for the purpose of
the usury laws is McGaloiard v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 2348
(1975).
111. See text accompanying notes 3 8-43 supra.
112. CAL. Civ. CODE §2982(c).
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wants a product. He wants a washing machine that will wash, a TV set
that will show a clear picture, an auto that will get him where he wants to
go. He doesn't want it to leak, squeak or explode. He doesn't want it to
damage him or his family, or put him to any cost or inconvenience. If it
does, he wants to have redress against the person who put him in posses-
sion. As he seeks redress, the question again arises: does it matter wheth-
er the transaction was a "sale" or a "lease"?"'
At least part of the question seems to have a clear answer. That is: as
far as personal injuries are concerned, it appears that in California, a
lease will be treated exactly like a sale. In Price v. Shell Oil Co.," 4 the
court held that an injured workman might recover damages for his per-
sonal injuries from a lessor just as he would from a seller. Quoting
from an earlier opinion, the court remarked that the lessor, like the
seller, "places [an article] on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects. . . .""I It appears that the lease in
Price was a "true" lease and not the sort of downside risk lease under
scrutiny here. But there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the
court would limit its holding to "true" leases only.'"'
In any event, the story doesn't end with Price. Price was decided as a
matter of strict liability in tort. Not all cases are personal injury cases.
The California Supreme Court has held that for cases involving mere
"economic loss," tort law will not control." 7 Rather, the basic body of
doctrine will be the law of warranty. In California, there are two relevant
sources of warranty law. If the transaction is a "sale," the controlling
doctrine comes from Division 2 of the Commercial Code, supplemented
by the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act." 8 If, by contrast, it is a
"lease," then the transaction is governed by a separate section of the Civil
Code."19
Both of these sources impose basic liabilities on the merchant that
appear to be at least roughly analogous with one another. But there is an
important difference. The "sale" sources impose restrictions on the mer-
chant's power to disclaim-get out of-the liabilities that would other-
113. See generally Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uni-form Commercial Code, 39 FoPDHAM L 1 EV. 447, 449-51 (1971).
114. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 466 P.2d 722 (1970).
115. Id. at 251, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182, 466 P.2d at 726, quoting Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 377 P.2d 897, 900(1962). See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 789 (1969).
116. For an interesting argument in favor of such a limitation, see Comment,
Finance Lessor's Liability For Personal Injuries, 1974 U. ILL. LF. 154.
117. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 ,P.2d 145(1965).
118. CAL. Comm. CODE Div. 2, §2101 et seq.; Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act, CAT. Civ. CODE §§1790-1790.4.
119. CAL. CIV. CODE §1955.
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wise be imposed.120 These apply to "sales" but not (at least not explicit-
ly) to "leases." So the question becomes: will the warranty provisions of
the Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly Act apply to leases as well
as to sales?
There is no authority on the point in California, but there are favora-
ble authorities from other states. The leading case is Sawyer v. Pioneer
Leasing Corp.,'2' where the court held that a downside risk lease was
"analogous" to a sale, and that the Code warranty would apply. Other
cases are in accord. 2a Supportive as they are, at least one nagging ques-
tion remains. That is, what did the Sawyer court mean when it said that
this type of lease is "analogous" to a sale? In what sense was it not a
sale? For all practical purposes, it seems that the only material distinc-
tion between the "lease" in Sawyer and a "sale," was that the parties
chose to call it a "lease" rather than a "sale." Surely vital principles
should not be made to turn on such slender distinctions. The court un-
doubtedly reach the right conclusion, but it was too tentative in its
reasoning.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Up to now, we have said nothing about consumer goods other than
autos. It seems to be the case that open-end leasing grew up first in the
auto industry. But there is evidence that it is extending to other products
as well. 123 The possibilities are inspiring: leased speedboats and golf
clubs, then leased color television sets, finally leased encyclopedias, vac-
uum cleaners and kiddie chairs. Presumably, the definition of "retail
installment contractor" in the consumer goods act is substantially the
same as the definition of "sale" that was in the RLA at the time of Thom-
as v. Wright.14 Presumably some lawyers have been advising their
clients that Thomas v. Wright is good law and would apply (as it certain-
ly should) to golf clubs as it did to autos.
Moreover, California's "cooling-off" statute, which permits the con-
sumer to rescind a contract for goods or services sold door to door, ex-
120. CAL. CoMMx. CODE §2316; CAL. Crv. CoDE §1792.4.
121. 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
122. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59
Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 392 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316
N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315
(D.C. Ark. 1971). See generally Shapiro, The ABC's of Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 433,
441, and Comment, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions,
10 B.C. INm. & CoM. L. REv. 127 (1968).
123. BoARD oF GovERNoRs OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH-I-LEND IG,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR TIM YEAR 1974, in CCH INsTALLMENT CEnrr
GUIDE 14-16 (No. 326, pt. II, Jan. 15, 1975); BoARD OF GOvERNORS OF am FEDERAL
RESERvE SYSTEM, TRUTH-iN-LENDING, ANNUAL REPORT TO CoNGREss FOR THE YEAR
1973, in CCH INSrALLmENT CREDrr GUrD 14-15 (No. 271, pt. II, Jan. 16, 1974).
124. CAL. Crv. CODE §1802.6. This, of course, is essentially the old UCSA lan-
guage again.
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plicitly covers leases as well as sales.125 Thus while we may be treated
to the spectacle of encyclopedia leasing, at least the law does not allow
it to be done door to door. The Consumer Legal Remedies Act is
similarly broad. 2 '
The problem of how to treat a transaction that looks like a lease but
acts like a sale has not spread significantly beyond auto leasing. Not yet,
anyway. But the potential is there, and it does not appear premature to
include all open-end leases in our interrogatory and to ask: what is to be
done?
My view should be obvious by now. If someone gives me something
that he calls a trombone, but which I recognize as an Airedale, I want to
get it a dog license. Similarly, for purposes of consumer protection stat-
utes, I want to treat downside risk leases like sales. I would get rid of the
Moscone Act as a snare and a delusion. As a policy proposal, this is
bound to provoke howls of anguish, but as a technical matter it isn't
difficult at all.
A brief statute to be used as a definition is included at the end of this
section, but first it may be useful to discuss an alternative reform propos-
al, to show its virtues and its defects. Tis proposal is offered in the pro-
posed Uniform Consumer Credit Code.' 27 A closely similar variant has
been offered by the Federal Reserve Board as a proposal for amendment
to the Truth-in-Lending Act. 2' The proposal has much to recommend
it. But ultimately it is flawed. In any event, it merits examination.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides that it will apply where
there is a "consumer credit transaction,' 29 defined to include, among
other things, "a consumer credit sale"' 30 and "a consumer lease."'13
One form of sale is a "sale of goods," which, in language that ought
to be familiar by now:
includes an agreement in the form of a bailment or lease of goods
if the bailee or lessee pays or agrees to pay as compensation for use
a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value
125. CAL. CIv. CODE §§1689-1693.
126. CAL. CrV. CODE §§1750-1784.
127. See UCCC §§1.301(14), 3.202, 3.301, 3.401. For another reform proposal
see Comment, Automobile Leasing: Is The Moscone Act Really Protecting The Con-
sumer?, 14 SANTA CLARA LkwYEm 612, 650-58 (1974). The proposal has many construc-
tive aspects. My main quarrel with the Santa Clara proposal is that it seems to take the
"sale-lease" transaction at face value, failing to recognize that they have such functional
similarity that they can best be treated as identical.
128. BOARD OF GovE wORs O THE FEDERAL REsEirE SYSTEM, TRuTH-IN-LENDiN,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1974, in CCH INsTALLMENT CREDIT
GuiDE 19-24 (No. 326, pt. II, Jan. 15, 1975).
129. UCCC §1.301(13).
130. UCCC §1.301(12).
131. UCCC §1.301(14).
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of the goods involved and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will
become, or for no other or a nominal consideration has the option
to become, the owner of the goods upon full compliance with the
terms of the agreement.' 32
"A Consumer lease" is defined to include:
a lease of goods: (i) which a lessor engaged in the business of leas-
ing makes to a person, except an organization, who takes under
the lease primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural
purpose; (ii) in which the amount payable under the lease does not
exceed $25,000; (iii) which is for a term exceeding four months; and
(iv) which is not made pursuant to a lender credit card ...133
So far, this is very encouraging stuff. One may note, for example, that
the definitions expressly exclude short-term leases, like the airport rental
car. That is all to the good. But further, there seems to be a clear intent to
do something significant about the lease problem.
And the promise is fulfilled. A number of rules apply alike to sales
and leases. These include general limitations on confession of judg-
ment, 34 assignment of earnings,3 5 attorney fees,' 36 advertising, 37 de-
138 :3linquency charges and deferral charges. 9 Other sections seek to pre-
serve defenses, both against assignees140 and against third party
lenders.' 4 ' Another section restricts the use of referral sales agree-
ments.' 42 The leases transaction is also protected by the provisions regu-
lating insurance, 3 4 and is covered by the sections on administration
4 4
and remedies.' 45
Most intriguing are two sections that apply to leases alone. The first
has to do with disclosure.' 46 The disclosure statement requires that the
consumer lessee be given notice of a variety of basic terms in his agree-
ment. Among other terms, the consumer must get a "statement of the
conditions under which the lessee may terminate the lease before the end
of the term; and [a] statement of the liabilities the lease imposes upon
the lessee at the end of the term.'
' 47
132. UCCC §1.301(35).
133. UCCC §1.301(14).
134. UCCC §3.306.
135. UCCC §3.305.
136. UCCC §2.507.
137. UCCC §3.209.
138. UCCC §2.502.
139. UCCC §2.503.
140. UCCC § §3.303, 3.404; see also §3.204.
141. UCCC §3.405.
142. UCCC §3.309.
143. UCCC art. 4.
144. UCCC art 6.
145. UCCC art. 5.
146. UCCC §3.202.
147. UCOC §3.202(g)-(h).
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Plainly, these provisions are aimed at mitigating the "supposed evils"
of the open-end lease. But a further look at the Act suggests that there
is no need for this protection. This is so because a separate section of
the Act provides that the obligation of a lessee upon expiration of a
consumer lease may not exceed twice the average payment allocable to
a monthly payment under the lease.14 The comment removes all doubt
that the section is directed at the open-end leasing problem, which it
summarizes with admirable clarity. Just why the draftsmen felt it was
so important to give notice of the end-of-lease liability when they
weren't going to allow anything special anyway is hard to perceive.
There are other curiosities about this liability limitation section. One
is that the protection given the lessee under this section is much better
than the protection given the buyer against the comparable problem of
balloon payments.' 4 When the sale contract includes a balloon payment,
the payment is not void; rather the consumer gets only a right to refi-
nance on terms no less favorable than those of the original transaction.
Since, practically speaking, this is probably all the seller ever hoped for
anyway, the balloon payment section is equal to nothing at all. But here
we have a familiar theme, played backwards. If the limitation on final
payments is good for the lessee, why isn't it good for the seller?
Another difficulty with the limitation on the final payments clause
may be accidental. But at least it certainly needs correction. And at most,
it may be a clue as to how little the draftsmen understood the leasing
problem. This provision says that the limitation on final payments in a
consumer lease "does not apply to charges for damages to the leased
property or for other default."' 50 Presumably, if "damage" means the
case where the lessee ordinarily would be liable for physical damage to
the property, he will still be liable. There seems to be no obvious prob-
lem in holding him liable here. But the "default" problem is a different
issue. As it stands, the provision would seem to say that if the lessee has
paid 36 out of 36 payments, he can be held liable for a sum equal to no
more than two or three extra monthly payments; but if he defaults in
the 35th month, he can be held for the entire decline in the value of
the car. There is no apparent basis for the distinction. It would seem to
have the effect of encouraging the dealer to induce or assert default
whenever he feels there is the slightest chance to get any significant
extra sum out of the consumer. It must be an oversight or a misunder-
standing on the part of the draftsmen.
The result, then, is a muddle. The situation is so confused that I can't
148. UCCC §3.401.
149. UCCC §3.308.
150. UCCC §3.401.
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even say for sure which statute a dealer would prefer to operate under:
there are some advantages in the "sale" section, and some in the
"lease" section. But assuming there is some advantage in one section
over another, then there is an additional anomaly. It is this: if the dealer
feels he is constrained by the disclosure sections of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, he can simply rename his transaction a "lease" and
be rid of them. On the other hand, if he feels limited by the balloon
payment provisions of the "lease" he can call it a "sale" and be free
of them. The choice is his. There is no "real" sale or "real" lease at
the heart of the section. It is all a matter of names. This brings me
around again to the basic point I have been contending for throughout
this section. That is: there is no need for a special article. The typical
open-end lease ought properly to be regarded as within the specific
definition of "sale" carried down through the generations from the
UCSA.
Obviously, this is not the prevailing view. But it seems that by any
measure, the situation is unsatisfactory. Better to try again-and here is
a suggested approach. Scuttle the consumer lease provision for time
being, until there is some evidence of need for a special statute address-
ing leases where there is no "downside risk." Settle the balloon payment
issue, one way or another. Then broaden the basic coverage of the act.
Something like the following ought to do the job:
"Transaction" for purposes of this act shall include any arrange-
ment, however characterized, whereby a consumer acquires the
right to take possession and make use of goods in exchange for a
promise to pay a sum substantially equal to or in excess of the
aggregate value of the goods involved. The term includes, but is
not limited to, an agreement that the consumer for no other or for
a nominal consideration has the option to become the owner of the
good upon full compliance with its terms.
Undoubtedly this definition has problems, and perhaps it could be
put more clearly. Obviously, the use of this definition would require
some adjustment to related definitions in particular statutes, as well. But
it seems to be a starting point. And it has an additional virtue: it sets the
demarcation between "sale" and "lease!' without mentioning either
term.
